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EPA’s Category 3  
Marine Emissions Standards 
MIMICKING MARPOL ANNEX VI OR  
MOCKING THE CLEAN AIR ACT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With all the emphasis that the media places on 
automobile emissions,1 many citizens would be shocked to 
know that on a typical day, container ships2 docking at the Port 
of Los Angeles release more smog-forming pollutants than one 
million cars.3  In fact, ships produce almost as much pollution 
in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area as the 350 largest 
industrial polluters in Southern California combined.4  While 
great strides have been made by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and state legislators5 to reduce emissions from 
automobiles6 and stationary point sources,7 little attention has 
  
 1 See, e.g., Tim Molloy, L.A. Air Quality Better, But Still Bad, MONTEREY 
COUNTY HERALD, Nov. 5, 2004; Tony Manolatos, Drivers may pay for clean air, 
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 6, 2005, at 1. 
 2 “Container ships are cargo ships that carry all of their load in truck-size 
containers.”  Wikipedia, Container ship, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/container_ship 
(last visited January 24, 2005).  Container ships are some of the largest vessels to sail 
the ocean, only outsized by crude oil carriers or tankers.  Id.  The majority of container 
ships have diesel engines.  Id. 
 3 Gary Polakovic, Finally Tackling L.A.’s Worst Air Polluter, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2002, at B1. 
 4 Craig Welch, Bush Cut Some Diesel Pollution but Let Big Ships Keep 
Spewing, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A1. 
 5 State legislatures are involved in developing environmental legislation 
through the creation of state implementation plans or SIPs, which specify emissions 
limitations, control measures, and the methods to be used in that state to satisfy the 
Clean Air Act requirements.  THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 45 (Robert J. Martineau, 
Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004).  States are generally given deference by the 
EPA in developing their own SIPs, as well as in interpreting and implementing their 
SIP programs.  Id. at 46. 
 6 E.g., Control of Emissions of Air Polluion from Highway Heavy-Duty 
Engines, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,693 (Oct. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 86) 
(reducing NOx emissions from highway diesel engines by 50% in 2004); Control of Air 
Pollution from New Motor Vehicles:  Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and 
Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 69, 80, 96) [hereinafter 66 Fed. Reg. 5002] (decreasing 
NOx and particulate matter emissions from heavy duty trucks and buses by 90 to 95% 
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been given to the emissions from large marine vessels, which 
utilize some of the dirtiest engines in the world.8  Given the 
negative impact these huge vessels have on air quality, it is 
imperative to question why the EPA has not implemented 
regulations greatly reducing their emissions. 
This Note will analyze the rules promulgated by the 
EPA in 2003 to regulate the environmental emissions from 
large cargo and cruise ships.9  Part II begins by examining the 
EPA’s Category 3 emissions10 regulations.  This section 
discusses the underlying Executive Branch bias that affected 
the EPA’s decision-making process in promulgating its final 
rule.  Due to political pressure, the EPA limited the scope of 
  
beginning in 2007); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor 
Vehicle Emission Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 
6698, 6724 (Feb. 20, 2000) (reducing total NOx by 4.5% in 2007 and 14.5% in 2030 by 
controlling emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks).  Many states have 
also mandated the use of special reformulated gasoline that reduces air pollution by 
producing fewer emissions.  See, e.g., Approval of Promulgation and Implementation 
Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706, 59,710 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) 
[hereinafter 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706] (proposing the use of reformulated gas in New York); 
Max Jarman, Reformulation, Demand Drive Valley Gas Costs Up, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 
4, 2004, at D1 (discussing the use of reformulated gasoline in Arizona).  Meanwhile, 
other states directly invite citizens to file complaints about the emissions from other 
automobiles.  See, e.g., Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Smoking Vehicle 
Program, http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/implementation/air/mobilesource/vetech/ 
smokingvehicles.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).  For example, in Texas, citizens may 
log onto the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) website and report 
a car, truck, or bus that was producing fumes.  Id.  After an online report has been filed 
with the TCEQ, the owner of the offending vehicle will be notified that the automobile 
may be excessively contributing to air pollution.  Id.  The purpose of the TCEQ’s online 
reporting system is to inform vehicle owners that car maintenance can improve air 
quality and vehicle performance.  Id. 
 7 A stationary source is “any building, structure, facility, or installation 
which emits or may emit any air pollutant.”  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2000).  Under this 
definition, both a power plant and an individual boiler are stationary sources.  THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 177.  E.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706, supra note 
6, at 59,712 (proposing NOx and volatile organic compound (VOC) reductions from 
stationary sources in New York, which were later approved by the EPA without a 
detailed discussion in Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 23,849 (May 10, 2001)) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): 
Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and 
Replacement, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,249 (Oct. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51 & 52) (detailing the New Source Review process which mandates that new 
stationary sources or existing sources that undergo modifications obtain permits 
limiting emissions.  Existing sources need only obtain permits under the New Source 
Review program if the modifications change the method of operation or increase the 
amount of pollutants emitted). 
 8 Gary Polakovic, supra note 3. 
 9 Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or 
Above 30 Liters per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746 (Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 94) [hereinafter 68 Fed. Reg. 9746]. 
 10 See infra note 20 (defining Category 3 vessels). 
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Category 3 emissions regulations to only U.S.-flagged vessels 
even though the agency had jurisdiction to reach all vessels 
entering U.S. ports.11  As a result, the regulations fail to meet 
the mandate of Section 213(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act of 2000 
(CAA)12  and will not regulate the emissions from the majority 
of the vessels polluting U.S. air.13  Part III describes the 
international standards that regulate Category 3 emissions.14  
This section explains why the United States is obligated to 
abide by these international regulations15  and how the EPA’s 
standards place U.S.-flagged vessels at a disadvantage 
compared to foreign-flagged vessels.  Finally, Part IV examines 
the latest legal challenge to the EPA’s regulations, which were 
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court under arbitrary and 
capricious review.16  This section asserts that the D.C. Circuit 
Court had a duty to require the EPA to take a “hard look”17 at 
the alternatives and evidence; however, the court failed to do so 
even though Congress has recently taken steps to try to ensure 
future EPA decisions are based on science rather than 
politics.18  The Note concludes with a plea to the judiciary and 
the legislature to take action to prevent the Executive Branch 
from using political pressure to make a mockery of the goals of 
the CAA. 
  
 11 See infra Part II.D (discussing how the EPA has jurisdiction over Category 
3 vessels, including those that are foreign-flagged). 
 12 42 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2000). 
 13 Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or 
Above 30 Liters per Cylinder, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, 37,563 (May 29, 2002) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 94) [hereinafter 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548] (noting that approximately 94% of 
the vessels that call to U.S. ports are foreign-flagged vessels). 
 14 See infra Part III (discussing MARPOL Annex VI, the international treaty 
regulating Category 3 vessel emissions). 
 15 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships 1973, 
Article 5(4).  See infra Part III.B. 
 16 Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 17 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385 (1989); Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 
458 F.2d 827, 838 (1972). 
 18 H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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II. WHY THE EPA’S CATEGORY 3 EMISSIONS RULEMAKING IS 
INADEQUATE 
A. Political Bias Affected the EPA’s Category 3 Emissions 
Rulemaking 
As the result of a settlement,19  the EPA proposed 
regulations limiting air pollution produced by large marine 
vessels with an engine displacement at or above 30 liters per 
cylinder (hereinafter referred to as either Category 3 vessels or 
engines).20 
The EPA’s final rule regulating Category 3 vessel 
emissions directly conflicts with the agency’s original position 
on the subject.21  Upon reading the EPA’s final Category 3 
rulemaking notice, one might initially accept the agency’s 
explanation that it is best for the U.S. to refrain from 
regulating foreign-flagged Category 3 vessels until more 
stringent international regulations are adopted because 
uniform standards are needed to improve air quality 
domestically and internationally.22  However, one becomes 
skeptical of the agency’s explanation upon learning that a 2002 
  
 19 Settlement Agreement at 2, Earth Island Inst. v. EPA, No. 00-1065 (D.C. 
Cir. Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/largesi/ 
setlemnt.pdf [hereinafter Earth Island Settlement].  This settlement was a product of a 
suit brought by Earth Island Institute and Bluewater Network against the EPA.  Id.  
The petitioners sought review of a final rule promulgated by the EPA in 1999 to 
regulate emissions from new marine compression-ignition engines at or above 37 kW.  
Id.  The environmental groups alleged that the EPA’s 1999 rule violated the Clean Air 
Act because it failed to establish emission standards for certain marine engines.  Teri 
Shore, Environmental Perspective Marine Emissions and Air Quality Impacts 6 (2004), 
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/reports/rep_cv_shipping.pdf.  The case settled with 
the EPA agreeing to issue a proposed rule to regulate nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions 
from Category 3 marine compression-ignition engines prior to April 30, 2002.  Earth 
Island Settlement, supra, at 2. 
 20 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9.  Category 3 marine vessels are typically 
large seagoing vessels such as “container ships, tankers, bulk carriers, and cruise 
ships.”  Id.  However, some of these vessels do navigate on the Great Lakes.  67 Fed. 
Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,564.  In contrast, Category 1 marine diesel engines 
are similar to land-based engines utilized in construction and farm equipment.  Id.  
Category 1 engines have a specific engine displacement of less than 5.0 liters per 
cylinder.  Id.  Category 2 engines are similar to locomotive engines.  Id.  The specific 
engine displacement of Category 2 engines is between 5.0 and 30 liters per cylinder.  
Id. 
 21 Compare 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, with JEAN MARIE REVELT, 
ASSESSMENT AND STANDARDS DIVISION, DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE CONTROL OF 
EMISSIONS FROM NEW MARINE COMPRESSION-IGNITION ENGINES AT OR ABOVE 30 
LITERS/CYLINDER – DOCUMENTS FORWARDED TO OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
(March 20, 2002) available at http://docket.epa.gov/edkpub/do/ 
EDKStaffItemDetailView;jsessionid=816E1367812C5058C68C413F8C35C7B1?objectId
=090007d48014de71 [hereinafter LETTER TO OMB]. 
 22 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9750. 
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draft of the EPA’s proposal to regulate Category 3 vessel 
emissions under the CAA stated that foreign-flagged vessels 
should be regulated.23  The EPA expressed this initial opinion 
in a memorandum written to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB),24  explaining that “it may be appropriate and 
within EPA’s authority to treat engines on foreign vessels that 
enter U.S. ports as new engines and subject to regulation under 
section 213 [of the CAA] based on their significant emissions 
contribution to air quality problems in the United States.”25  
Further, the document noted that not only would the engine 
upgrades required to meet the proposed standards be relatively 
inexpensive, but pollution would be significantly reduced as a 
result of this new rulemaking.26  The agency’s memorandum 
also explained that emissions from foreign vessels should be 
regulated in order to be consistent with the intent of the CAA, 
as well as from a pure policy perspective.27  However, the 
agency’s emission policy abruptly changed after the EPA and 
the OMB began discussing the EPA’s proposed Category 3 
regulations.28  After the OMB gave its input to the EPA and 
“aligned” the EPA’s plan with the President’s policies,29  the 
EPA’s May 2002 Federal Register notice merely invited 
comments from interested parties regarding whether the 
agency had the authority to regulate emissions from foreign 
vessels30  and whether a lower limit than the international 
standard should be placed on the sulfur content of the fuel used 
  
 23 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 2. 
 24 The Office of Management and Budget reviews agency rulemaking through 
in-depth regulatory reviews.  OMB in Perspective, Office of Management and Budget, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization/omb_overview_slides.pdf (last visited 
January 3, 2005).  The agency is responsible for aligning the “actions, policies, and 
statements and proposals to reflect the President’s policies.”  Id. 
 25 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58. 
 26 Id. at 12 (noting that if the agency instituted tougher Tier 2 regulations, 
which would reduce pollution by 11% by 2030, total vessel costs would only increase by 
0.1%). 
 27 Id. at 59.  See infra Part II.E.1 (discussing the EPA’s initial arguments to 
the OMB). 
 28 Welch, supra note 4.  The OMB and EPA discussed how to revise the 
proposed regulations in April 2002.  See JEAN MARIE REVELT, MATERIALS SUBMITTED 
TO EPA FROM THE OFFICE OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (April 27, 2002) available at 
http://docket.epa.gov/edkpub/do/EDKStaffItemDetailView;jsessionid=816E1367812C50
58C68C413F8C35C7B1?objectId=090007d48014de71.  A revised April 26, 2002 portion 
of the rulemaking shows that the EPA removed its discussion of the appropriateness of 
regulating foreign vessels.  Compare id. with LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21. 
 29 See supra note 24. 
 30 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,551. 
1070 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
by Category 3 vessels in U.S. waters.31   Essentially, the OMB 
pressured the EPA to propose emissions standards that went 
no further than the current performance from ships.32   
B. The EPA’s Final Category 3 Rule 
The final Category 3 emissions rule, published on 
February 28, 2003, provided an exemption to all foreign-flagged 
vessels,33  placed a limit on nitrogen oxide (NOx),34  and failed to 
set any standards regulating the sulfur content of marine 
fuel.35  The regulation mentions two tiers of NOx emission 
controls.36  Tier 1 controls were instituted in 2004 and are 
intended to be equivalent to internationally negotiated NOx 
standards.37  The standards only apply to new U.S.-flagged 
vessels with engines built on or after January 1, 2004.38  The 
EPA also reserved the option of adopting Tier 2 regulations to 
further reduce NOx limits in the future.39  The agency 
additionally noted that when it reconsiders the standards in 
2007, it will investigate placing a limit on the sulfur content of 
  
 31 Id. at 37,548.  Marine fuel currently has an international maximum sulfur 
content of 50,000 ppm or 5%.  EU Reaches Accord on Ship Emission Sulfur Limits, 
LLOYD’S LIST, June 29, 2004, at 12.  The sulfur content of fuel is regulated because 
sulfur oxide or SOx is formed when fuels containing sulfur are burned.  SO2:  What Is 
It?  Where Does It Come From?, Environmental Protection Agency,  
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/what1.html.  SOx is a regulated pollutant that 
causes respiratory problems, aggravates heart and lung diseases, contributes to acid 
rain, and causes visibility impairment through the formation of fine particles in the air.  
Chief Causes For Concern, Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/ 
urbanair/so2/chf1.html. 
 32 Welch, supra note 4; see also 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9769. 
 33 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759. 
 34 Id. at 9761.  Nitrogen oxide is an ingredient of ground-level ozone.  Id. at 
9751.  Ground-level ozone is the primary component in smog, which causes respiratory 
problems, decreases lung function, and aggravates asthma.  Id. 
 35 Id. at 9751. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 9749-50.  Although the EPA’s standards are primarily equivalent to 
those in the international standard set by MARPOL Annex VI, there are a few 
differences between the regulations.  Id. at 9769.  The major differences between the 
international standards and those stipulated in the EPA’s Tier 1 lie within witness 
testing, durability requirements, and testing procedures.  Id.  See also infra Part III 
(discussing the international MARPOL Annex VI standards). 
 38 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9746.  However, the EPA adopted a 
separate definition of “new vessel” which will also regulate those older U.S.-flagged 
vessels that have undergone a “major conversion.”  Id. at 9760.  This change to the 
definition of new vessels is necessary because the average Category 3 vessel is used for 
25 years, but a substantial percentage of U.S.-flagged ships are over 30 years old.  40 
C.F.R. Part 94, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (April 30, 2002) at 30-31, RIN 2060-
AJ98 [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. 
 39 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9762. 
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marine fuel and will reconsider whether to impose the new Tier 
2 standards upon foreign-flagged vessels.40  
The EPA promulgated these regulations limiting the 
emissions from Category 3 vessels to fulfill the agency’s 
obligations under Section 213 of the CAA.41  Under the CAA, 
the EPA must promulgate National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants,42  including lead, 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide 
(CO), particulate matter (PM),43  and ozone.44  These standards 
are intended to protect human health and to limit maximum 
air quality concentrations.45  Areas with poorer air quality than 
permitted under the NAAQS requirements are designated 
“nonattainment” areas.46  Section 213(a)(1) of the CAA orders 
the EPA Administrator to determine whether nonroad engines 
“cause, or significantly contribute to, air pollution that may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”47  If the Administrator determines that nonroad 
engine emissions of CO, volatile organic compounds (VOCs),48  
and NOx significantly contribute to ozone or CO emissions in 
  
 40 Id.  Final Tier 2 standards for Category 3 engines will be provided by the 
EPA on or before April 27, 2007.  Id. at 9763.  The EPA also noted that future Tier 2 
regulations may contain HC (hydrocarbon) and CO (carbon monoxide) emissions 
standards to ensure that these emissions do not increase on an engine-specific basis.  
Id. 
 41 Id. at 9748. 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000); National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS), Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html. 
 43 Particulate matter (PM) is a term used to describe fine particles in the air, 
such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke.  Particulate Matter – What Is It?  Where Does It 
Come From?, Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ 
pm/what1.html.  PM has been linked to causing premature mortality, decreasing lung 
function, and aggravating respiratory and cardiovascular disease, as well as asthma.  
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9752. 
 44 Bernard F. Hawkings, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review 
Program:  Prevention of Significant Deterioriation and Nonattainment New Source 
Review, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 131.  Ground-level ozone is 
the primary component in smog.  68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9751.  Ozone 
impacts human health by causing respiratory problems, aggravating asthma, and 
decreasing lung function.  67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,557.  Upon 
inhalation, it can lead to changes in lung tissue.  Id.  Furthermore, ozone reduces crop 
yields and forest ecosystem productivity.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 
38, at 23. 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000). 
 46 Hawkings & Ternes, supra note 44, at 132. 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(1) (2000). 
 48 Volatile organic compounds, or VOCs, combine with NOx to form ozone.  
Ground-level Ozone:  What Is It?  Where Does It Come From?, Environmental 
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ozone/what.html.  For a discussion 
of ground-level ozone, see supra note 44. 
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multiple non-attainment areas, the EPA is then required to set 
emission standards for the different classes of engines that 
contribute to this problem.49  In 1994, the EPA determined that 
nonroad engines do significantly contribute to NOx 
nonattainment50  and marine engines should be regulated.  
Thus, the EPA initiated the rulemaking procedures to propose 
new regulations for nonroad engines.51 
C. The Need For More Stringent Category 3 Regulations 
While the EPA has taken progressive steps to severely 
tighten emission standards for highway vehicles52  and other 
types of nonroad diesel engines,53  the diesel engines on 
Category 3 vessels continue to emit pollutants virtually free of 
regulation.54  The lack of regulation on large marine vessels is 
surprising since most Category 3 vessels burn “bunker fuel,” a 
low quality petroleum that is capable of producing 
approximately “fifty times more haze-forming pollutants than 
the dirtiest diesel trucks on U.S. highways.”55  Marine vessels 
release hazardous emissions while they are moving in and out 
of ports, as well as when they are loading and unloading cargo 
while docked.56  Since diesel emissions are likely human 
  
 49 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000). 
 50 Control of Air Pollution; Determination of Significance for Nonroad 
Sources and Emission Standards for New Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines at or 
Above 37 Kilowatts, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,307 (June 17, 1994) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9 & 89). 
 51 Id. at 31,336. 
 52 The EPA promulgated rules limiting PM and NOx emissions from heavy 
duty engines by 90% and 95%, respectively.  66 Fed. Reg. 5002, supra note 6, at 5002.  
Furthermore, the regulations on heavy duty engines also reduce diesel sulfur content 
by 97%, slashing sulfur content to 15 ppm beginning June 1, 2006.  Id. at 5002, 5006.  
As a result, the fuel sulfur content standard for heavy duty engines will match that of 
highway diesel engines.  Compare id. with Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from 
Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,960 (June 29, 2004) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 69, et al.) [hereinafter 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958]. 
 53 New regulations will reduce PM and NOx emissions from nonroad diesel 
engines used in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries by 
95% and 90%, respectively.  69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52, at 38,960.  The EPA 
has also dramatically reduced the sulfur content used in these nonroad engines by 99% 
so that the standard will match the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard.  Id. 
 54 Polakovic, supra note 3.  James J. Corbett, a professor of marine policy at 
the University of Delaware noted that current controls on ship emissions are 
approximately equivalent to where the emissions controls were on cars in 1965.  Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571 (explaining that many ships 
produce “hotelling” emissions when they run one or several engines to produce 
electricity while in port loading or unloading the vessel). 
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carcinogens,57  there is cause for great concern about the lack of 
regulation of marine engine emissions.  Furthermore, 
emissions from diesel engines contribute to the production of 
smog,58  the green house effect,59  and the formation of acid 
rain.60  Due to the emissions produced by Category 3 vessels, 
many commercial ports and coastal cities are out of attainment 
with respect to the NAAQS for ozone, PM, and CO.61  By 2020, 
emissions from marine diesel engines will account for 
approximately three to twenty-eight percent of mobile source 
NOx emissions in certain port cities.62  Moreover, the problem of 
air pollution caused by marine vessels is not isolated to port 
cities.63  Marine emissions also affect the air quality in areas 
located near heavy shipping channels.64  Because marine 
vessels move from port to port, and from country to country, 
the problem of marine vessel air pollution is global.65   
  
 57 Michael J. Horowitz, Regulation of Mobile Sources:  Motor Vehicles, 
Nonroad Engines, and Aircraft, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 
323. 
 58 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,552 & n.3. 
 59 BLUEWATER NETWORK, A STACKED DECK:  AIR POLLUTION FROM LARGE 
SHIPS 3 (2000), available at 
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/reports/rep_ss_ships_stackeddeck.pdf. 
 60 Id. at 4. 
 61 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,562.  The EPA’s own data 
estimates that Category 3 emissions accounted for 7.4% of the NOx emissions in the 
non-attainment area of Baton Rouge/New Orleans in 1996, a contribution that is 
expected to increase to 15.8% by 2020.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, 
at 36.  This increase is due not only to anticipated increases in shipping traffic, but also 
the decreasing contribution of highway vehicles, as the EPA tightens motor vehicle 
pollution regulations.  Id. at 35. 
 62 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,548. 
 63 Reports conducted by the Department of Defense show that emissions 
released within 60 nautical miles of the coastline make it back to land.  Id. at 37,560.  
A report from the Ozone Transport Assessment Group estimates  that emissions within 
the continental U.S. can affect air quality in locations up to 500 miles from the source.  
Id. at 37,580.  Therefore, marine emissions can greatly decrease the air quality even in 
areas without large ports simply because the area is near the shoreline.  Id. at 37,563.  
For example, marine vessels contribute to approximately 37% of the total NOx in Santa 
Barbara.  Id.  As the amount of NOx pollution created by motor vehicles decreases, 
marine emissions are anticipated to increase to 62% of the NOx production in Santa 
Barbara by 2015.  Id. at 37,562-63. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See, e.g., Press Release, Clean Ships Get Into Gear After Years of Slow 
Steaming, European Union Press Releases, European Commission (June 28, 2004), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/810 
&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (noting ships are the 
largest source of SO2 emissions in the EU).  Regardless of where emissions are initially 
released, air pollutants often have an international impact because the pollutants 
become trapped in upper air winds, moving along with the weather patterns and 
traveling internationally.  See International Issues & U.S. Air Quality, Environmental 
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/international.html.  See also 
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D. Jurisdiction to Regulate Foreign-Flagged Vessels 
Despite the EPA’s failure to extend its Category 3 
rulemaking to foreign-flagged vessels, the U.S. is not 
preempted from regulating the emissions from foreign vessels 
or even from creating stricter standards than the 
internationally agreed upon marine pollution standards.66   In 
fact, the EPA has jurisdiction to control the emissions from 
foreign-flagged vessels based on international law.67   
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.68  (hereinafter 
Aramco), the Supreme Court held that legislation does not 
apply extraterritorially unless there is a clearly expressed 
intention that Congress meant for the legislation to apply 
outside the U.S.69  This principle is founded upon the policy 
that limiting the scope of legislation to U.S. territories prevents 
international clashes of law and international discord.70  
However, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not 
apply in three specific situations.71  First, the presumption is 
not applicable if Congress expressed an affirmative intent for 
the legislation to apply to activities in other countries.72  
Second, the presumption does not apply when failure to extend 
the statute to a foreign country would adversely affect the 
U.S.73  Finally, the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
  
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htm (last visited 
January 3, 2005) (explaining that scientists discovered in the 1960s that emissions 
from continental Europe were polluting Scandinavian lakes). 
 66 MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 2, Regulation 10(4), http://www.imo.org (last 
visited April 6, 2006) (follow “Information Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Free IMO 
Texts” and “MARPOL” hyperlinks to access Annex VI) [hereinafter MARPOL Annex 
VI].  See infra Part III (discussing the international Category 3 standards).  See also 
Dan Lickel, Comment, Regulating Foreign Vessels Under the Clean Air Act:  The Case 
for a Permissible Administrative Interpretation, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 145 (2002). 
 67 Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-65. 
 68 499 U.S. 244 (1991).  Aramco involved a Title VII claim brought by a U.S. 
citizen employed abroad by a United States employer regarding the company’s 
employment practices.  Id. at 246-47. 
 69 Id. at 248.  See also Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) 
(stating that unless a contrary intent of Congress is shown, legislation is meant to only 
apply within the U.S. territory since Congress is primarily concerned with domestic 
issues). 
 70 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)). 
 71 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (1993). 
 72 Id.  See also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). 
 73 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.  This exception to the presumption typically 
applies to cases of anti-trust, securities, or trademark laws.  Id.  See, e.g., Steele v. 
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not valid when the conduct being regulated occurs within the 
United States.74  Here, the third exception clearly applies to 
emissions created by foreign-flagged ships sailing in U.S. 
waters or those that are docked at U.S. ports.75  Adverse effects 
such as poor air quality and the related health problems caused 
by air pollution76 will result in the U.S. if emissions from 
foreign-flagged vessels are not regulated,77 so the second 
exception could also arguably apply; however, the second 
exception is generally limited to cases involving anti-trust, 
securities, or trademark law.78  Regardless, since the third 
exception applies here, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality did not bar the EPA from imposing 
regulations upon the emissions from Category 3 foreign-flagged 
vessels. 
Another presumption against extending U.S. law to 
foreign-flagged vessels exists if doing so would interfere with 
relations between the crew and the ship’s owner.79  However, 
regulating emissions from foreign-flagged vessels does not 
present any “internal affairs” or management issues that would 
otherwise preclude exercising control over the vessel while in 
U.S. waters.80  Therefore, as with the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the EPA was also not prevented from 
promulgating Category 3 emissions based upon this second 
presumption. 
With regard to applying laws to foreign entities, “a 
nation having some ‘basis’ for jurisdiction to prescribe law 
  
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act applies 
extraterritorially); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(securities laws apply extraterritorially); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 
F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (U.S. antitrust laws apply extraterritorially). 
 74 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.  The “presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of statutes described in Aramco does not apply where the conduct regulated 
by the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States. . . .”  Id. at 529.  
See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (explaining that “[t]erritoriality-based jurisdiction thus allows states to 
regulate the conduct or status of individuals or property physically situated within the 
territory”). 
 75 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959)) 
(noting that the presumption did not apply when the harm occurred while the vessel 
was in U.S. waters). 
 76 See supra notes 31, 34, 43, 44 for discussion of adverse effects. 
 77 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 12, 21-38. 
 78 See supra note 73. 
 79 Dowd v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 975 F.2d 779, 788-89 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 80 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 
10, 21 (1963). 
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should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction 
‘with respect to a person or activity having connections with 
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable.’”81  Whether it is reasonable to extend 
jurisdiction over the actions of other nations depends upon 
many factors, including “the extent to which the activity takes 
place within the territory [of the regulating state]”82 and “the 
character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of 
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other 
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the 
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.”83  Here, 
the regulations upon emissions from Category 3 emissions 
would affect vessels located within U.S. territory.84  Further, 
improving ambient air quality is of great importance to the 
U.S., as evidenced by the expansive scope of the CAA.85  
Moreover, other countries have taken unilateral action to try to 
reduce marine emissions.86  Hence, extending the U.S.’s 
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels is reasonable.87 
Merely falling outside the presumptions against 
extraterritoriality does not establish U.S. authority to regulate 
foreign Category 3 vessels.  However, a broad interpretation of 
Article 33 of the international UNCLOS88 treaty may be 
  
 81 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the Laws of the United States § 403(1) 
(1987)). 
 82 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 403(2)(a) (1987). 
 83 § 403(2)(c). 
 84 See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1922). 
 85 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2000).  See also LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 52, 
59. 
 86 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,556.  For example, Sweden has 
unilaterally pushed for stricter emissions reductions from marine vessels.  Id.  By 
differentiating fairway and port dues based upon NOx emissions levels and fuel sulfur 
content, Sweden reduced NOx and sulfur emissions by 75% within five years.  Id. 
 87 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58. 
 88 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. 409 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter 
UNCLOS 1982].  UNCLOS 1982 regulates the uses and resources of the sea, including 
navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of 
resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships 
through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine resources, 
protection of the marine environment, and marine research and contains a binding 
procedure for settlement of disputes between nations.  Oceans and Law of the Sea, The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_historical_perspective.htm (last visited January 3, 2005).  Since UNCLOS 
1982 is intended to represent customary international law, the U.S. has acknowledged 
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sufficient to allow the United States to extend its jurisdiction 
over foreign-flagged vessels.89  Article 33 of UNCLOS addresses 
the contiguous zone, which extends twenty-four miles from the 
coast baseline of all shoreline countries that choose to assert 
such authority.90  In order to prevent infringement upon 
sanitary laws and regulations, countries may exert control over 
the actions of foreign vessels that are in the contiguous zone in 
order to protect their territories and seas.91  The CAA falls 
within the ambit of Article 33, which permits states to enforce 
environmental laws in the contiguous zone if the law exists to 
protect people from direct health threats.92  Furthermore, the 
  
in several ways that it is bound by the treaty, despite the fact that it has not ratified 
UNCLOS 1982.  Lickel, supra note 66, at 154 & n.61. 
 89 Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-62.  Lickel’s article also analyzes whether the 
U.S. could have authority under Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982 to extend the reach of 
the CAA to foreign-flagged vessels.  Id. at 156.  While coastal states generally have full 
legislative jurisdiction over foreign vessels within their waters, laws of coastal states 
must not “apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships 
unless they are given effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.”  
G.P. PAMBORIDES, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LAW:  LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
43 (1999) (quoting Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982).  However, under Article 21(2), if a 
coastal state suspects that a vessel is in violation of its anti-pollution legislation, the 
state “may inspect the vessel and institute legal proceedings should they conclude that 
the conduct of the vessel was not in compliance.”  Id. at 44.  Furthermore, coastal 
states have full jurisdiction over foreign vessels that have willfully and seriously 
violated pollution regulations.  Id.  Although the jurisdictional reach of coastal states is 
rather broad, the enforcement powers of the states are limited to merely arresting 
vessels that have violated legislation if there has been “major damage or threat of 
major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal state or to any 
resources of its territorial sea.” Id. at 44-45.  Even though any future EPA Tier 2 
regulations would probably require changes to the construction or design of the vessels, 
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9749, it is unlikely that a court would uphold the 
EPA’s authority as extending CAA regulations over foreign vessels under Article 21(2) 
of UNCLOS because the pollution regulations imposed are more akin to discharge 
standards than actual design or construction standards.  Lickel, supra note 66, at 158-
59.  In fact, the European Union (EU) rejected using Article 21(2) as the basis to apply 
NOx regulations to foreign-flagged vessels prior to the enactment of MARPOL Annex 
VI, declaring the regulations to be more like discharge standards than design 
standards.  Id.  Hence, Article 21(2) of UNCLOS is likely insufficient to support 
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels.  Id. at 159. 
 90 UNCLOS 1982, supra note 88, art. 33(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.   The 
coastal baseline is the low-water mark along the coast, which is measured at low tide.  
Environmental Defender’s Office of Western Australia, Coastal Law Maps, 
http://www.edowa.org.au/publications/books/coastlawmaps.html (last visited January 
2, 2005).  Most countries at least choose to assert control over their own territorial 
waters, which extend twelve miles outward from a coastal nation.  Tara Magner, A 
Less Than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 
53, 74 (2004).  UNCLOS 1982 was intended to reflect customary international law, so 
the principles contained within it apply to all countries regardless of whether they 
have ratified the treaty or not.  See Lickel, supra note 66, at 154. 
 91 UNCLOS 1982, supra note 88, art. 33(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409. 
 92 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one of the purposes of the 
subchapter is “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to 
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United States has already recognized that Article 33 may be 
utilized to assert prescriptive jurisdiction in the contiguous 
zone.93  In fact, the Clean Water Act (CWA) explicitly prohibits 
discharges of oil or hazardous substances into the contiguous 
zone.94  Therefore, some environmentalists have compared 
regulating emissions from all marine vessels entering U.S. 
waters to the authority the United States exercised under the 
CWA following the Exxon Valdez oil spill.95  After this disaster, 
Congress instituted tougher safety requirements on ships 
entering U.S. waters.96  Environmentalists argue that the EPA 
should now exercise similar jurisdiction over marine emissions 
regardless of flagship by instituting tougher air regulations on 
Category 3 vessels.97 
Case law further supports the proposition that the EPA 
has the authority to promulgate regulations that reach foreign-
flagged vessels.  In Department of Transportation v. Public 
Citizen,98 the respondents filed suit against the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), an agency within the 
Department of Transportation,99 for failure to promulgate 
regulations in compliance with National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)100 and the CAA.101  The Supreme Court ruled that 
  
promote the public health and welfare”).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
application of Article 33 to the CAA, see Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-62.  Lickel also 
discusses a third basis for possibly providing jurisdiction through Article 56(b) of 
UNCLOS 1982, but determines that such an argument is weaker since hard scientific 
evidence would be necessary to prove a link between the marine engine emissions and 
a negative impact on fisheries or the coastal marine environment.  Id. at 162-64. 
 93 Lickel, supra note 66, at 161. 
 94 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(A) (2004)). 
 95 See Welch, supra note 4. 
 96 See Oil Pollution Act Overview, http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/opaover.htm; 
Oil Pollution Act § 4115 (1990) (codified as amended 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)) (requiring 
vessels to be equipped with a double hull if they are carrying oil in the United States). 
 97 Welch, supra note 4. 
 98 541 U.S. 752 (2004).  At issue here was whether FMCSA needed to 
consider the environmental effects caused by an “increase in the number of roadside 
inspections of Mexican trucks and buses due to the [agency’s] proposed regulations.”  
Id. at 761. 
 99 Id. at 758. 
 100 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000)).  NEPA was established with 
the intent of reducing environmental damage by requiring that federal agencies 
evaluate the environmental impacts of their proposed actions.  Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 
at 756-57.  Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), evaluating the proposed project’s possible environmental impacts.  Id. 
at 757.  Although NEPA contains this procedural requirement, the Act imposes no 
substantive requirements upon the agency.  Id. at 756.  Hence, once the EIS procedural 
requirement has been fulfilled, agencies cannot be forced to choose a specific action 
based upon the findings in the EIS.  Id. 
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FMCSA was not statutorily required under NEPA to consider 
the environmental effects caused by Mexican-domiciled motor 
carriers crossing into the United States.102  The Court’s decision 
hinged on the role that FMSCA occupied in regulating these 
vehicles.103  Since FMCSA merely grants registration to 
vehicles, the Court determined that the administration did not 
need to address the environmental emissions from foreign 
automobiles since FMCSA itself lacks statutory authority to 
create or enforce emission controls.104  Nowhere in its decision 
did the Court state that an agency with direct authority to 
promulgate regulations on emission controls, such as the 
EPA,105 would be unable to reach these vehicles.106  In fact, the 
EPA has noted that the scope of its authority to regulate motor 
vehicles crossing the U.S. border is broad and covers “virtually 
any, if not all” motor vehicles.107  
Just as the EPA has broad authority to regulate motor 
vehicles within and crossing into the United States,108 the 
agency commented in its 2002 memo to the OMB that it should 
have similarly broad authority under the CAA to regulate new 
nonroad engines.109  The EPA’s argument is supported by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon.110  In 
Cunard, the Court determined that the National Prohibition 
Act was so broad that it applied to foreign-flagged passenger 
ships, banning them from storing liquor onboard while the 
vessels were in U.S. ports.111  In assessing the reach of the 
Prohibition Act, the Cunard Court noted that the Prohibition 
legislation made no distinction between domestic and foreign-
flagged vessels.112  Therefore, the Court refused to infer that 
Congress intended to provide an exemption to foreign-flagged 
vessels.113  The Cunard Court emphasized that providing such 
an exception to foreign-flagged vessels would actually 
  
 101 Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756. 
 102 Id. at 773. 
 103 Id. at 772. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). 
 106 See generally Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752. 
 107 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 59. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 262 U.S. 100 (1923). 
 111 Id. at 125-26. 
 112 Id. at 126. 
 113 Id. 
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“embarrass” enforcement of Prohibition, while defeating the 
purpose of the Act.114  More recently, the 11th Circuit affirmed 
the Cunard Court’s conclusion by declaring in Stevens v. 
Premier Cruises, Inc.115 that Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) is not inapplicable, as a matter of law, to 
foreign-flagged cruise ships sailing in U.S. waters.116  As in 
Cunard, the Stevens court determined that it would be 
“strange” if Congress only intended Title III of the ADA to 
apply to domestic cruise ships, despite the breadth of the Act.117  
Here, with regard to regulating Category 3 vessel emissions, 
even the EPA admits that Section 213 of the CAA has a broad 
purpose and reach.118  Given the scope of the CAA, it definitely 
would be “strange” if Congress only intended Section 213 to 
apply to domestic ships in U.S. waters119 because such an 
exemption would defeat the purpose of the Act,120 which is to 
control emissions that “cause, or contribute to significant air 
pollution problems.”121  Since the EPA has already determined 
that Category 3 vessels cause or contribute to significant air 
pollution problems,122 all vessels entering U.S. ports should be 
regulated by the CAA.123 
In sum, the U.S. has previously extended its jurisdiction 
over foreign-flagged vessels located in U.S. waters if the act at 
issue is sufficiently broad.124  This precedent provides a sound 
basis for the EPA to exercise authority over foreign-flagged 
vessels within the agency’s Category 3 regulations in order to 
further the CAA’s goal of providing clean ambient air.125 
  
 114 Id. 
 115 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 116 Id. at 1243.  Furthermore, even when an act takes place outside U.S. 
territory, the Court has recognized that statutes can still be interpreted as applying 
abroad if the act has a “broad jurisdictional grant,” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 
U.S. 280, 286 (1952), and “sweeping reach.”  Id. at 287. 
 117 Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243. 
 118 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58-59. 
 119 Cf. Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243. 
 120 Cf. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 126 (1923). 
 121 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(1) (2000). 
 122 See supra notes 50 and 51, and accompanying text. 
 123 Cf. Cunard, 262 U.S. 100 at 126; Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243. 
 124 See, e.g., Cunard, 262 U.S. at 126; Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243. 
 125 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (2000). 
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E. Category 3 Rulemaking is Not Consistent with the CAA 
or the EPA’s Past Rulemaking 
The EPA’s Category 3 rulemaking is questionable for 
several reasons.  First, the regulation misinterprets the Clean 
Air Act and significant terms within the Act.  Second, this final 
regulation fails to press for advancement in emissions 
technology, as required by the CAA and as that section of the 
Act is interpreted by the courts.  Lastly, allowing foreign-
flagged vessels to escape regulation is inconsistent with the 
agency’s recent crackdown on emissions from other mobile 
sources. 
1. EPA’s Final Category 3 Rule Misinterprets the 
Clean Air Act 
Maritime vessels are not explicitly mentioned anywhere 
in the CAA.126  However, Congress introduced the expansive 
category of nonroad engines and vehicles to the CAA through 
the 1990 Amendments to the Act.127  These amendments placed 
all marine vessels into the broad category of nonroad engines, 
which are regulated by Section 213 of the CAA.128 
The Category 3 final rulemaking notice explains that 
the EPA did not make the engines on foreign-flagged vessels 
subject to the CAA since they are temporarily within the 
country, as opposed to items that have been imported into the 
United States.129  However, the agency’s 2002 memorandum to 
the OMB argued that foreign-flagged vessels should be 
regulated because the meaning of “import” in the CAA is 
“ambiguous.”130  In its memo, the EPA explained that 
“legislative history does not suggest that Title II’s use of 
‘import’ can only be given its meaning under the customs laws 
of the United States.”131  According to the EPA, using the 
  
 126 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). 
 127 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
 128 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000). 
 129 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759. 
 130 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 60. 
 131 Id.  Under customs law, a boat is not imported into the U.S. if there is no 
intent to bring the vessel permanently into the country.  Am. Customs Brokerage Co. v. 
United States, 375 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (Cust. Ct. 1974).  Unless Congress clearly 
intended otherwise, “the word ‘importation’ means the bringing of goods within the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States with the intention to unlade them.”  Porto 
Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 616 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1935) (citing 
United States v. Field & Co., 14 U.S. Cust. App. 406, 407 (Cust. App. 1927)). 
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customs meaning of “import” may not be appropriate in 
interpreting Section 213 since the CAA and customs laws have 
very different purposes.132  The agency further cautioned that 
interpreting the term “import” as having the same meaning in 
the CAA as under customs laws may “frustrate section 213’s 
goals” because this interpretation would leave foreign-flagged 
vessels unregulated.133  Supporting the agency’s argument is 
precedent from the Supreme Court noting that the word 
“import” should be construed in the ordinary sense.134  As a 
result, “import” should be interpreted as meaning “bringing an 
article into a country from the outside,”135 which includes the 
country’s ports and harbors.136  The item need not be brought 
into the country through a customs house or even taken off of 
the ship itself.137  Thus, by simply entering the waters or ports 
of the United States, a foreign-flagged vessel is subject to the 
jurisdiction and laws of the U.S. because it has imported 
everything on the vessel.138   
The EPA’s explanation in its 2003 final rulemaking that 
foreign vessels are outside the scope of the CAA139 is also 
undercut by the agency’s arguments in 2002 to the OMB 
regarding interpretation of the terms “nonroad engines”140 and 
“nonroad vehicles.”141  In its memorandum to the OMB, the 
EPA described the CAA’s use of the term new nonroad engine 
  
 132 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 60. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 121 (1923).  The Cunard Court 
faced the issue of whether the alcohol contained on foreign-flagged passenger ships for 
the use of the crew and passengers violated the Prohibition Act.  Id. at 119.  Although 
the forbidden spirits stayed onboard the ships, the Court determined that by 
construing the term “import” in its ordinary sense, the alcohol had been brought within 
U.S. territory, which extends to include ports and harbors.  Id. at 122. 
 135 Id. at 122. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759. 
 140 42 U.S.C. § 7550(10) (2000), defining nonroad engine as follows: 
an internal combustion engine (including the fuel system) that is not used in 
a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition, or that is not subject 
to standards promulgated under section 7411 of this title [Standards of 
performance for new stationary sources] or section 7521 of this title 
[Emission standards for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines]. 
 141 42 U.S.C. § 7550(11) (2000), defining nonroad vehicle as “a vehicle that is 
powered by a nonroad engine and that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for 
competition.” 
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as “ambiguous.”142  However, the agency noted that the 
definitions of nonroad engines and nonroad vehicles were 
modeled after the statutory definition “new motor vehicle 
engine,” which includes those engines that have been 
imported.143  In fact, neither the term nonroad engine nor 
nonroad vehicle discusses the origin of the equipment.144  
Because the Senate expressly instructed the EPA to define 
nonroad engines on the basis of function or design,145 the 
agency’s position in the OMB memorandum is reasonable.146  
Critics of the foreign-flag exemption maintain that the EPA 
should not be permitted to include other exceptions or 
limitations upon the terms nonroad engines and nonroad 
vehicles since Congress provided the agency with instructions 
on how to properly classify the terms.147  However, even the 
EPA noted in its 2002 OMB memorandum that regulating 
foreign-flagged vessels is reasonable because Congress failed to 
provide an exemption here, while other types of mobile sources 
were given exemptions elsewhere in the CAA.148 For example, 
the Act does not cover new nonroad vehicles and engines used 
solely for competition149 or those used for “research, 
investigations, studies, demonstrations, or training or for 
reasons of national security.”150  Therefore, because Congress 
provided explicit limiting language in other sections of the Act 
to exempt foreign-flagged vessels from the reach of the CAA,151 
there is good reason to believe that Congress did not intend to 
provide an exemption here for foreign-flagged vessels.  Hence, 
it can be argued that there is no basis for  the agency’s removal 
of foreign-flagged vessels from the category of nonroad 
engines.152 
  
 142 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58. 
 143 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (2000)). 
 144 42 U.S.C. §§ 7550(10)-(11) (2000). 
 145 S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 104-05 (1989). 
 146 See Lickel, supra note 66, at 169 (stating that “Congress effectively 
enjoined the EPA from classifying marine vessels by flag for the purpose of adopting 
regulations”). 
 147 Id. 
 148 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 59. 
 149 Id. at 60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7552(10)-(11) (2000)). 
 150 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7522(b)(1) (2000)). 
 151 Id.  See also Lickel, supra note 66, at 169-70 (explaining that Section 183(f) 
of the CAA contains an implicit exception for foreign-flagged vessels by referring to 
“different ports,” which can only be interpreted to mean foreign ports since the CAA 
clearly reaches all domestic ports). 
 152 Lickel, supra note 66, at 169.  Extending the CAA to reach foreign-flagged 
vessels is also reasonable given the past actions and statements of the Executive 
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2. The EPA’s Final Rule Fails to Press for 
Advanced Technology 
Rather than comply with the actual language of Section 
213 of the CAA, the OMB convinced the EPA to promulgate 
Category 3 emissions regulations153 that fail to reflect the 
mandate of Congress.154  The EPA’s regulations do not fulfill 
the purpose of the CAA because the final rule does not impose 
emissions standards that reflect the capabilities of the latest 
technology,155 as required by Section 213.156   
Section 213 of the CAA regulates the emissions 
standards for nonroad engines and vehicles.157  Under this 
section, the EPA Administrator is required to promulgate 
regulations for new nonroad engines that contribute to air 
pollution.158  Further, the Administrator must set standards 
that “achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction 
achievable through the application of technology which the 
Administrator determines will be available.”159  Therefore, 
Section 213 of the CAA is “a technology-forcing standard”160 
with an overriding goal of air quality.161  Although 
considerations such as cost, noise, energy, and safety are 
significant, these factors are intended to be subordinate to the 
primary goal of improving air quality whenever a standard is 
technology-forcing.162  In fact, when Section 213 of the CAA was 
enacted, the EPA “was expected to press for development and 
  
Branch.  For example, President Clinton stated that the CAA can be used to reduce air 
pollution within the territorial sea.  S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, at 36 (1994) (referring 
to nonroad engine sections of the CAA). 
 153 Welch, supra note 4.  See Part II.E.1, supra. 
 154 See Part II.E.1, supra. 
 155 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that 
“[i]mprovements in fuel systems and engine cooling can reduce Category 3 engine 
emissions even more than the Annex VI NOx limits would require.”).  See also 67 Fed. 
Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571. 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000). 
 157 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000). 
 158 Id. at § 7547(a)(3). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Technology-
forcing statutes force industry to improve existing methods and develop new strategies 
to reduce pollution, rather than rely upon the excuse that better methods do not exist.  
Sky Stanfield, The Mobile Source Air Toxics Rule: How Does the Greatest Reduction 
Become No Reduction?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 563, 573 (2004). 
 161 Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 200. 
 162 Id. 
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application of improved technology rather than be limited by 
that which exists today.”163 
Based upon the language Congress used in this 
technology-forcing section regulating nonroad engines and 
vehicles,164 one would expect the EPA to set the emissions 
standards that would reflect the newest technological 
advancements within the emissions control industry.  However, 
the EPA’s proposed regulations are based upon information 
and studies conducted between the years of 1992 and 1997.165  
The EPA itself acknowledged that in the interim there have 
been advancements in NOx control, which would permit further 
emission reductions beyond the standards instituted by the 
final rule.166  Specifically, the agency noted that by using in-
cylinder controls, an additional reduction of thirty percent in 
NOx levels beyond Tier 1 can be achieved, while reductions fifty 
percent beyond Tier 1 NOx levels can be “achieved by 
introducing water into the combustion process.”167  
Furthermore, the EPA explained that selective catalytic 
reduction (SCR) could reduce NOx emissions by more than 
ninety percent.168  At the time the EPA promulgated these 
rules, the agency was fully aware that “these [emission 
reduction] systems are . . . being used on ferries and cruise 
ships,”169 and that “four slow-speed Category 3 marine engines . 
. . have been successfully equipped with SCR units.”170  
Unfortunately, the EPA did not mandate the use of any of 
these technologies on Category 3 vessels.171 
While commenting on the capabilities of technology, the 
EPA also explained that the technology that will reduce 
emissions from Category 3 engines is similar to that already in 
  
 163 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 2d. Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974)).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 
273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352. 
 164 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000). 
 165 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14. 
 166 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571.  The EPA also noted that 
some countries, such as Sweden, are unilaterally pushing for stricter emissions 
reductions from marine vessels.  Id. at 37,556.  By differentiating fairway and port 
dues based upon NOx emissions levels and fuel sulfur content, Sweden reduced NOx 
and sulfur emissions by 75% within five years.  Id. 
 167 Id. at 37,588. 
 168 Id. at 37,589. 
 169 Id. at 37,590. 
 170 Id. at 37,591. 
 171 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9749-50. 
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use on other engines.172  Although the agency asserted that 
Category 3 engines are similar to the engines used at 
municipal power plants to generate electricity,173 the EPA made 
no further mention in the Category 3 rulemaking of the 
regulations imposed upon or the technologies used at power 
plants to control emissions.174  The agency merely went on to 
point out that Category 3 engines are not similar to any land-
based mobile engines.175  However, despite the differences 
between Category 3 engines and land-based mobile engines, 
the EPA commented that the engineering principles utilized to 
control emissions from Category 3 engines and land-based 
engines are primarily the same.176  Therefore, many of the 
techniques used to control emissions created by smaller 
nonroad and highway diesel engines can be used on Category 3 
engines.177  Considering that there are comparable engines to 
the Category 3 engines and these comparable engines are 
subject to environmental regulations,178 the EPA should have 
discussed in its rulemaking notice why those available 
technologies used to control the emissions from power plants 
and smaller nonroad and highway diesel engines are not 
mandatory for Category 3 engines.  Instead, the EPA refrained 
from pressing for development in marine emission controls due 
to “outstanding technical issues” and the lack of current 
application of existing technology to marine diesel engines.179  
By failing to promulgate regulations that require the use of 
technology that is already capable of achieving the stringent 
emissions limits placed upon land-based engines, the EPA’s 
action appears arbitrary and unsupported by the agency’s own 
internal findings. 
In sum, the agency’s explanation that it needed 
additional time to evaluate the capabilities of technology,180 is 
at odds with the basic premise of technology-forcing 
  
 172 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,564. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See generally id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 37,567. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). 
 179 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9750. 
 180 Id. at 9748. 
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standards.181  When Congress established technology-forcing 
standards, the EPA was not expected to be able to make 
predictions about future advances in technology.182  Rather, the 
EPA merely needs to identify the primary steps necessary to 
develop emission controls and to explain why the agency 
believes that industry can find a solution before the phase-in 
period183 concludes.184  Since the EPA is required to “press for 
development,”185 and is not supposed to be limited by existing 
technology in setting technology-forcing standards,186 the 
agency should not be allowed to promulgate Category 3 
emission regulations that reflect standards that are over a 
decade old.187 
3. The EPA’s Rulemaking Is Inconsistent With the 
Agency’s Past Acts 
The EPA’s rulemaking is also inconsistent with the 
more stringent standards it promulgated for smaller marine 
engines.188  For example, regulations imposing a nine year 
phase-in period from 1998 to 2006 upon spark-ignition marine 
engines, including outboard engines, personal watercraft 
engines, and jet boat engines, will reduce hydrocarbon 
emissions by seventy-five percent in 2025.189  While the agency 
  
 181 See Stanfield, supra note 160, at  573 (2004) (noting that technology-
forcing statutes force industry to improve existing methods and develop new strategies 
to reduce pollution, rather than rely upon the excuse that better methods do not exist). 
 182 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
 183 Phase-in periods are often established to delay when a new regulation will 
be enforced in order to allow the affected parties to become familiar with the regulation 
and to develop compliance procedures.  Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 184 Natural Res. Def. Council, 655 F.2d at 332. 
 185 S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 2d. Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974).  See also H.R. REP. 95-294, 
at 273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352. 
 186 H.R. REP. 95-294, at 273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1352. 
 187 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14. 
 188 See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution; Final Rule for New Gasoline Spark-
Ignition Marine Engines; Exemptions for New Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines 
at or Above 37 Kilowatts and New Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines at or Below 19 
Kilowatts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,088, 52,089 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89, 90, 
and 91). 
 189 Id. at 52,089-90.  See also Control of Emissions From Nonroad Large 
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational Engines (Marine and Land-Based), 67 Fed. 
Reg. 68,242, 68,244-45 (Nov. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 89, 90, 91, 94, 
1048, 1051, 1065, and 1068) (implementing a final rule for control of emissions from 
 
1088 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
has been pressing for uniformity in land-based emission 
regulations,190 it is odd that larger marine vessels would not be 
subject to environmental regulations similar to those imposed 
upon their smaller counterparts. 
Ironically, although the EPA recently defended the 
Category 3 emissions regulations in court as complying with 
the CAA,191 the U.S. has been lobbying internationally for years 
to impose stricter NOx limits upon Category 3 vessels.192  
Several years prior to issuing the EPA’s final rule, the U.S. 
submitted a proposal to the United Nations’ Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)193 suggesting 
reductions in the proposed international NOx limits by twenty-
five to thirty percent beginning in 2007.194  While the U.S. felt 
comfortable requesting a lower NOx standard internationally in 
2001, the EPA claimed in 2003 that more time was necessary 
to evaluate the capabilities of technology before tougher 
standards should be imposed in the U.S. upon Category 3 
vessel emissions.195  The inconsistency between these actions is 
startling. 
  
nonroad large spark-ignition engines and recreational engines such as snowmobiles, 
off-highway motorcycles, forklifts, all-terrain vehicles, and recreational marine diesel 
engines which will reduce NOx emissions by 82% and PM by 60% by the time of full 
implementation in 2030). 
 190 For example, the EPA set the fuel sulfur content standard for nonroad 
diesel engines in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries to 
match the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard. 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52, 
at 38,960. 
 191 Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  See infra 
Part IV (discussing the Bluewater case). 
 192 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 16-18. 
 193 MEPC 44/11/7, Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Revision of the NOx 
Technical Code, Tier 2 Emission Limits for Marine Diesel Engines at or Above 130 kW, 
submitted by the United States (May 2002), available at Docket A-2001-11, Document 
No. II-A-16.  The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is a committee 
within the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 
81.  The IMO is a United Nations agency, which was established in 1958 following an 
international convention in Geneva.  KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION 4 (1994).  See infra Part III.A (discussing the IMO). 
 194 MEPC 44/11/7, Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Revision of the NOx 
Technical Code, Tier 2 Emission Limits for Marine Diesel Engines at or Above 130 kW, 
submitted by the United States (May 2002), available at Docket A-2001-11, Document 
No. II-A-16.  See infra Part III.A (discussing MARPOL Annex VI and its standards). 
 195 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9748. 
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F. Most Vessels Entering U.S. Ports Will Be Unregulated 
Under EPA’s Rule 
One of the purposes of the Clean Air Act is to “protect 
and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to 
promote the public health and welfare.”196  However, the EPA’s 
Category 3 regulations will not achieve the CAA’s goal of 
improving air quality for the benefit of the public welfare 
because the rules do not apply to international vessels.197  
Studies have shown that there are approximately 
88,660 marine vessels registered internationally that are over 
100 gross tonnes.198  In the 1950s, international shippers began 
registering under “flags of convenience” to avoid the high costs 
of trading under the U.S. flag.199  In order to obtain such a 
designation, a shipper merely needs to establish a shipping 
company or representative legal entity in a particular 
country.200  Despite attempts to establish a “genuine link” 
between a ship and its flag, this criteria does not reflect actual 
shipping practices throughout the international community.201  
Therefore, many “flags of convenience” are held by American 
owned interests.202  Approximately 94 percent of the vessels 
  
 196 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000). 
 197 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747. 
 198 James J. Corbett, Updated Emissions From Ocean Shipping, 108 J. 
GEOPHYSICAL RES., No. D20 at 3, available at http://www.ocean.udel.edu/cms/jcorbett/ 
CorbettKoehlerJGR2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).  The international treaty, 
MARPOL Annex VI, only applies to marine vessels that are 400 gross tonnes or larger.  
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Chapter II, Regulation 5(1).  See infra Part III 
(discussing MARPOL Annex VI). 
 199 BRUCE FARTHING & MARK BROWNRIGG, FARTHING ON INTERNATIONAL 
SHIPPING 186-87 (3d ed. 1997).  See also PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 9 (explaining 
that shippers often use flags of convenience to pay lower taxes or crew salaries and 
social security).  There are approximately twenty countries that now offer flags of 
convenience, including Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Bahamas, and Malta, which are 
among the largest fleets in the world.  FARTHING & BROWNRIGG, supra, at 188. 
 200 FARTHING & BROWNRIGG, supra note 199, at 187.  Given the latest 
technology, flagship status can actually be changed instantaneously without much 
effort.  ADEMUNI-ODEKE, SHIPPING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS 68 (1988). 
 201 PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 4.  Many countries began operating Open 
Registries or “flags of convenience,” which ignored the ship owner’s nationality.  Id. at 
9.  Access to the Open Registries is often very easy and can even be obtained abroad.  
Id. at 10.  Open Registries are usually run by countries with little power and even less 
desire to consult shipping companies about the registry, id., or interest in requiring 
more than mere incorporation in the country where the company desires flagship.  Id. 
at 11 n.27. 
 202 Id. at 12.  Often the registries themselves are run out of locations other 
than those signified by the flag.  WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA 5 (2004) 
(explaining that ‘Liberia’ is run out of Virginia, ‘Cambodia’ is operated out of South 
Korea, and a group in London operates ‘Bahamas’). 
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that call to U.S. ports are foreign-flagged vessels.203  As a result 
of the expanding use of flags of convenience, the overwhelming 
majority of Category 3 vessels entering U.S. ports will be 
unregulated by the EPA.204   
To briefly summarize Part II, the EPA bowed to political 
pressure by changing its original position regarding Category 3 
regulation and agreeing to issue a weak rule at the urging of 
the Executive Branch.  The EPA’s final regulations fail to 
uphold the purpose and spirit of the CAA by improperly 
interpreting and applying Congress’ mandate, thereby allowing 
the majority of vessels entering U.S. ports to pollute the air 
without regulation.  Extending this sovereignty to foreign-
flagged ships frustrates the purpose of the CAA and negatively 
impacts the health and well-being of Americans. 
III. INTERNATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS 
A. The MARPOL Convention 
The United Nations (U.N.) developed the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to deal with global maritime 
problems and to provide guidance to the international 
community.205  The intent of the IMO was to promulgate 
  
 203 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563. 
 204 See LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 202, at 7.  See also 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, 
supra note 9, at 9758 (limiting Category 3 emissions standards to new U.S.-flagged 
marine vessels).  Due to the increase in the use of flags of convenience to save money, 
some critics claim that there are no new U.S.-flagged Category 3 vessels that will fall 
under the EPA’s emissions regulation.  Press Release, Bluewater Network, EPA 
Lawsuit Decision Allows Shipping Pollution to Grow, (June 28, 2004), 
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/press_releases/pr2004june28_cv_ship.pdf.  But see 67 
Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563 (indicating that increases in U.S. maritime 
trade will require the manufacture of seven to nine new U.S.-flagged vessels per year). 
 205 The IMO is a United Nations agency, which was established in 1958 
following an international convention in Geneva.  KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 4 (1994).  The purpose of the agency is to 
promulgate standards and regulations to govern the shipping industry.  Id. at 6-7.  
Members of the IMO “include not only the traditional maritime countries but also those 
which rely largely on the shipping services of other countries.”  SAMIR MANKABADY, 
THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, VOLUME 1:  INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 
RULES 2 (1984).  Currently, there are 166 member states in the IMO.  International 
Maritime Organization, Introduction to IMO, http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=3 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2005).  The organization is primarily comprised of an Assembly, a 
Council, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC), the Legal Committee, the Technical Co-operation Committee, and 
the Facilitation Committee.  PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 81. 
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international standards through the passage of Conventions.206  
Therefore, before any Convention goes into effect and becomes 
binding, a sufficient number of countries must ratify it, thereby 
ensuring that the standard is, in fact, international.207   
In the 1970s, the IMO developed the MARPOL 
Convention,208 of which the United States is a signatory.209  The 
MARPOL Convention is a combination of two treaties adopted 
in 1973 and 1978, covering prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment by ships.210  This treaty regulates oil, 
chemicals, garbage, sewage, and air emissions through six 
different Annexes.211   
In 1997, the IMO proposed MARPOL Annex VI to set 
limits on NOx emissions from ship exhausts212 and fuel sulfur 
content.213  Annex VI regulates the NOx emissions from diesel 
engines installed on ships constructed on or after January 1, 
2000 and diesel engines that have undergone a major 
  
 206 PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 83.  “Convention” is merely another word 
for a treaty.  LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER 73 (2d ed. 1999). 
 207 PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 83. 
 208 MARPOL 73/78 is officially referred to as the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 
1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), Nov. 2, 1973, 12 ILM 1319 (1973), as amended 
Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].  International 
Maritime Organization, Marine Environment Introduction, available at 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp (last visited January 8, 2005). 
 209 The United States became a member of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention on 
August 17, 1950.  MANKABADY, supra note 205, at 416. 
 210 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 208. 
 211 Id.  After rules on decision-making, information sharing, and substantive 
obligations have been established by a framework convention, annexes or protocols are 
often introduced to create more stringent obligations.  Suh-Yong Chung, Is the 
Convention-Protocol Approach Appropriate for Addressing Regional Marine Pollution?: 
The Barcelona Convention System Revisited, 13 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 85 (2004).  
Annex I of the MARPOL Convention prevents pollution by oil, while Annex II controls 
pollution caused by noxious liquid substances.  IMO, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating 
thereto (MARPOL 73/78), 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#7.  Annex III 
prevents pollution by harmful substances in packaged form.  Id.  Pollution by sewage 
from ships is regulated by Annex IV, and Annex V prevents pollution by garbage from 
ships.  Id.  Annex VI sets limits on air pollution from ships and prohibits the 
intentional discharge of emissions of ozone depleting substances.  See generally 
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66.  All parties must accept Annexes I and II, but 
Annexes III-VI are voluntary.  London Convention, The International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, MARPOL 73/78, available at 
http://www.londonconvention.org/marpol_73.htm. 
 212 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13. 
 213 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(1).  The Annex 
additionally prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances, which is 
outside the scope of this Note.  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 12. 
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conversion on or after that date.214  The Annex also limits the 
sulfur content of the fuel used by Category 3 engines to a 
maximum amount of 45,000 ppm.215   
Recognizing that the treaty would have to be adopted by 
a majority of the international community before it would have 
any effect upon international vessels, the IMO required Annex 
VI to be ratified by a minimum of fifteen countries with at least 
fifty percent of world merchant shipping tonnage before it 
would become active.216  After seven years, the Annex was 
  
 214 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13(1)(a).  Once the Annex 
has gone into effect, it can be applied retroactively to any ship constructed or converted 
on or after January 1, 2000.  Letter from the International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (July 16, 2002), 
http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/IntertankoSubmission.pdf.  A mandatory 
NOx Technical Code defines which types of engine conversions fall under the regulation 
of the Annex, as well as other details such as testing procedures, measurement 
methods, approved exhaust gas cleaning systems, and the effect of using fuel composed 
of blends.  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13.  The Convention set NOx 
emission limits according to engine speed.  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, 
Regulation 13(3)(a). 
 215 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(1).  Marine fuel 
currently has an international maximum sulfur content of 50,000 ppm or 5%.  EU 
Reaches Accord on Ship Emission Sulfur Limits, LLOYD’S LIST, June 29, 2004, available 
at http://lloydslist.com.  However, a country may request that the sulfur limit be 
lowered even further by submitting a petition to the Organization to designate a 
location as a SOx Emission Control Area (SECA).  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, 
Appendix III.  In a SECA, the sulfur content of fuel used by Category 3 marine engines 
is limited to a maximum of 15,000 ppm.  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, 
Regulation 14(4)(a).  Currently, two SECAs have been designated:  the Baltic Sea area 
and the North East Atlantic, which is comprised of the English Channel, the North 
Sea, and the Irish Sea.  EPA, Final Regulatory Support Document:  Control of 
Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 30 Liters per 
Cylinder (January 2003), at 1-9, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/r03004.pdf.  While in a SECA, a ship 
may either utilize fuel that complies with this lower sulfur limitation, or the vessel 
may alternatively limit SOx emissions through exhaust gas cleaning systems or other 
technological methods.  MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(4)(b) & (c). 
 216 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Article 6(1). 
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finally ratified in May 2004.217  It went into effect in May 
2005.218 
Although the U.S. has joined other sections of the 
MARPOL Convention,219 Congress has yet to ratify MARPOL 
Annex VI.220  Even if the U.S. elects not to ratify Annex VI, 
which is optional, as a member to the MARPOL Convention, 
the U.S. must still give effect to the treaty provisions and abide 
by its mandate.221 
B. The MARPOL “No More Favorable Treatment Clause” 
To prevent states from avoiding compliance by failing to 
ratify the treaty, the IMO created a “no more favorable 
  
 217 On May 18, 2004, Samoa was the fifteenth State to ratify the instrument, 
raising the percentage of participating parties to 54.57% of the world merchant 
shipping tonnage.  Press Briefing, International Maritime Organization, Air Pollution 
Rules to Enter into Force in 2005, http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp? 
topic_id=848&doc_id=3620 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).  Prior to that date, the other 
ratifying States were:  the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and 
Vanuatu.  International:  IMO Marine Engine Regulations, http://www.dieselnet.com/ 
standards/inter/imo.html.  Currently, 30 countries have ratified the Annex, covering 
63.72% of the world tonnage.  IMO, Summary of Status of Conventions as of August 31, 
2005, http://www.imo.org (follow “Conventions” hyperlink; then follow “Status of 
Conventions – Summary” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 218 Press Briefing, International Maritime Organization, Air Pollution Rules 
to Enter into Force in 2005, 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=848&doc_id=3620 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2005). 
 219 Summary of Status of Conventions as of August 31, 2005, International 
Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id% 
3D12899/status.xls.  The U.S. has ratified MARPOL Annexes I, I, III, and V.  Id. 
 220 The President submitted the treaty to the Senate in 2003.  Press Release, 
The White House, Message to the Senate of the United States (May 15, 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030515-12.html.  Congress was 
expected to ratify the treaty sometime in 2004.  Press Release, Bluewater Network, 
Shipping Air Pollution Treaty Sets Global Standards (June 7, 2004), 
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/press_releases/pr2004jun7_cv_annex.pdf.  No clear 
reason has been given for the U.S.’s lack of ratification of Annex VI.  Letter from the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (July 16, 2002), http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/ 
IntertankoSubmission.pdf.  However, the Senate usually will not defeat a treaty 
through a direct vote.  BURNS H. WESTON, Treaty Power, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1910 (L. Levy, et al. eds., 1986), reprinted in GURUSWAMY, 
supra note 206, at 214 [hereinafter Treaty Power].  Instead, consent is typically 
withheld from a controversial treaty through committee inaction.  Id.  In fact, 
sometimes the Senate even receives a request from the Executive Branch to withhold 
or suspend committee action.  Id. 
 221 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships 1973, 
Article 5(4) [hereinafter MARPOL 73]. 
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treatment” clause in the MARPOL Convention.222  This clause 
was intended to ensure that non-signatory states would not be 
better off than parties who ratified the agreement.223  Thus, the 
clause removes the motivation for countries to avoid complying 
with MARPOL provisions and the international standards of 
the convention by simply refusing to ratify the treaty.224  As a 
result, the MARPOL Convention creates a true international 
standard because all member States and even non-members to 
the convention must comply with ratified conventions.225 
The EPA’s Category 3 emissions rule ignores the import 
of the “no more favorable treatment” clause.  Unlike MARPOL 
Annex VI, which regulates all diesel engines installed after 
January 1, 2000 or those undergoing a major conversion on or 
after that date,226 the EPA’s rule is limited to new U.S.-flagged 
engines.227  The EPA’s regulations simply will not reach the 
vessel if it is foreign-flagged.228  Therefore, the United States 
will be obligated to change the EPA’s regulations to ensure that 
all foreign vessels are complying with MARPOL Annex VI if 
the U.S. ever opts to join the treaty.229 
The shipping industry itself has argued that even the 
minor discrepancies between the EPA’s rulemaking and 
MARPOL Annex VI will put U.S.-flagged vessels at a 
disadvantage.230  According to Intertanko, an international 
trade association that represents most of the tanker owners 
and operators throughout the world,231 because the certification 
procedures, verification requirements, and record keeping 
requirements vary between the EPA’s final rulemaking and 
MARPOL Annex VI, U.S.-flagged vessels will be forced to 
  
 222 Article 5(4) of MARPOL 73 states:  “With respect to the ship of non-Parties 
to the Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the present Convention as 
may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to such ships.”  
Id. 
 223 PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 106-07. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 110. 
 226 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13(1). 
 227 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747.  However, the EPA adopted a 
separate definition of “new vessel” which will also regulate those older U.S.-flagged 
vessels that have undergone a “major conversion.”  Id. at 9760. 
 228 See id. at 9746. 
 229 See MARPOL 73, supra note 221, Article 5(4). 
 230 Letter from the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (July 16, 2002), 
http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/IntertankoSubmission.pdf. 
 231 Id. at 1. 
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obtain dual certification while on foreign routes.232  Therefore, 
U.S.-flagged vessels will be hampered with additional 
paperwork and procedural requirements due to the EPA’s 
rulemaking,233 while foreign-flagged vessels will not be subject 
to these inconveniences.234  Hence, American vessels will be 
disadvantaged, while other countries will receive more 
favorable treatment. 
The EPA has acknowledged that in order to reduce 
marine air emissions effectively, a collaborative effort is needed 
within the international community.235  While claiming that it 
instituted regulations that mimic the international standard, 
the EPA has in fact acted unilaterally by promulgating 
regulations that disregard the enforcement of the MARPOL 
Annex VI regulations upon foreign-flagged vessels.236  Because 
the CAA and international law provide the EPA with the 
authority to regulate all maritime vessels within U.S. waters,237 
the U.S. could avoid giving favorable treatment to foreign-
flagged vessels if it chose to regulate all vessels entering U.S. 
waters.  Therefore, although the EPA’s final regulation doesn’t 
technically set a different emissions standard, by exempting 
nearly 94 percent of the marine traffic into U.S. ports,238 the 
EPA’s rule is not only ineffective, but it also violates the spirit 
of MARPOL by placing additional restrictions on US-flagged 
vessels.239   
IV. EPA CATEGORY 3 EMISSIONS REGULATIONS UPHELD 
A. The D.C. Circuit Gave Deference to EPA’s Category 3 
Regulations 
The EPA’s rules covering the emissions from Category 3 
vessels were recently challenged in Bluewater Network v. 
Environmental Protection Agency.240  Bluewater Network 
(hereinafter Bluewater) is an organization dedicated to 
  
 232 Id. at 8. 
 233 Id. 
 234 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747-48. 
 235 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,550. 
 236 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747-48. 
 237 Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-65.  See also Part II.E.1, supra. 
 238 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563. 
 239 See MARPOL 73, supra note 221, Article 5(4). 
 240 372 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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reducing air and water pollution and global warming.241  The 
environmental organization filed a petition for review with the 
D.C. Circuit Court, challenging the EPA’s two-tiered Category 
3 marine diesel engine emission standards.242  In this petition, 
Bluewater alleged that the Category 3 regulations violated 
Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA because the rulemaking failed to 
reduce emissions from these vessels and disregarded the 
emissions from foreign-flagged ships.243  However, the D.C. 
Circuit determined that the EPA “reasonably interpreted and 
implemented the CAA,” thereby denying Bluewater’s petition 
for review.244   
While evaluating Bluewater’s petition, the D.C. Circuit 
court applied the two-pronged test of Chevron, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.245  The Chevron test dictates that 
when a court decides whether an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute is permissible, the court must first determine whether 
Congress has spoken on the issue.246  If Congress has clearly 
expressed its intent on the issue, then both the agency and the 
court must give effect to the congressional intent.247  However, 
if Congress has not spoken directly on the issue, then the court 
must determine whether the agency’s decision is permissible 
  
 241 About Bluewater Network, Bluewater Network, http:// 
www.bluewaternetwork.org/aboutus.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).  Bluewater is 
particularly dedicated to reducing pollution from boats and watercraft since that was 
the organization’s primary purpose upon its foundation.  Id. 
 242 Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 406.  See also note 19, supra (explaining that 
Bluewater was a party to the original lawsuit challenging the EPA’s 1999 marine 
vessel regulations). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  Chevron involved an action brought by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenging the EPA’s decision to allow 
industrial sites to view their emissions as if they are contained in a “bubble.”  Id. at 
840.  Under this bubble concept, as long as the net amount of emissions at the facility 
do not increase, the EPA allows the company to increase emissions from a single source 
as long as an equivalent decrease in emissions is made somewhere else within the 
plant.  Id.  The NRDC alleged that this bubble concept was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the term “stationary source.”  Id.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. was allowed to 
intervene and argue in favor of the EPA’s regulation.  Id. at 841 n.4.  The Court upheld 
the EPA’s regulation, id. at 866, after applying the two-fold test described above. 
 246 Id. at 842. 
 247 Id. at 842-43.  With regard to Congressional intent, the judiciary ordinarily 
presumes that Congress does not intend to override treaties, so courts will try to 
interpret federal statutes and treaties dealing with the same subject (such as the CAA 
and MARPOL Annex VI here) as being compatible.  Treaty Power, supra note 220, at 
216.  Therefore, if MARPOL Annex VI had been ratified prior to the regulation of 
nonroad vehicles in the 1990s, the Bluewater court might have struck down the 
exemption to foreign-flagged Category 3 vessels.  Cf. id. 
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given the construction of the statute.248  Under this precedent, 
the Bluewater court had to give Chevron deference to the EPA’s 
regulations unless the court determined that the decision was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.”249   
Reviewing the EPA’s interpretation under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review, the Bluewater court was 
satisfied that the EPA had interpreted and implemented the 
CAA in a reasonable fashion.250  The court stated that the 
agency was not required to “adopt the most stringent 
standards,” but rather had to develop regulations that “reduce 
emissions to the greatest degree possible after considering the 
spectrum of available technologies and the costs and benefits 
associated with those technologies.”251  The court also noted 
that the agency had committed itself to implementing new 
technologies into tighter emissions standards when the EPA 
revisits the issue in 2007.252  Although the regulations did not 
reflect the current capabilities of technology, the court was 
satisfied that the agency took action “akin to the anti-
backsliding provision” that the D.C. Circuit had previously 
upheld in Sierra Club v. EPA.253  Finally, the Bluewater court 
explained that Sierra Club states that the EPA must consider 
  
 248 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 249 Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 410 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)). 
 250 Id. at 411. 
 251 Id. at 408. 
 252 Id. at 412.  In promulgating its final rule, the EPA opted to wait until 2007 
to revisit the issue of instituting Tier 2 emissions standards, which would be lower 
than the international MARPOL Annex VI levels.  68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 
9749.  The agency explained that there were “several outstanding technical issues 
concerning the widespread commercial use of these technologies” that mandated 
waiting before declaring Tier 2 emissions standards.  Id. at 9748.  By deferring the 
declaration of Tier 2 standards, the EPA would have time to “obtain important 
additional information on the use of the these [sic] advanced technologies.”  Id.  
According to the EPA, this  
new information may include (1) new developments as manufacturers 
continue to make various improvements to the technology and address any 
remaining concerns, (2) data or experience from recently initiated in-use 
installations using the advanced technologies, and (3) information from 
longer-term in-use experience with the advanced technologies that will be 
especially helpful for evaluating the long-term durability of emission controls. 
Id.  See also Part II.E.2, supra. 
 253 325 F.3d 374, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  Sierra Club involved a challenge to 
an EPA regulation that instituted an anti-backsliding provision for motor fuel 
regarding anti-toxic regulations.  Id. at 378.  The anti-backsliding rule in Sierra Club 
would prevent refiners or importers from increasing the toxicity of the emissions from 
their fuels beyond the baseline levels determined by emissions performance in 1998-
2000.  Id. 
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other factors aside from technology in its decision making 
process, including safety, cost, lead time, noise, and energy.254  
The D.C. Circuit noted that when it previously interpreted 
statutes similar to Section 213 of the CAA, these other statutes 
did not dictate how the agency must weigh all the possible 
factors during its rulemaking.255  Therefore, the court 
determined that a hierarchy among the factors should not be 
implied when interpreting Section 213.256 
Regarding Bluewater’s concerns about the rule’s foreign 
vessel exemption, the court declared this claim premature since 
Bluewater failed to respond to the EPA’s defense that waiting 
to resolve the issue until the 2007 Tier 2 rulemaking would not 
“lead to any significant loss in emissions reductions.”257  The 
EPA and the court both determined that this delay would not 
cause losses in emissions reductions because foreign-flagged 
ships would still be required to comply with the MARPOL 
Annex VI standards.258 
B. EPA Failed to Take a “Hard Look” at the Environmental 
Consequences 
Although arbitrary and capricious review of the EPA’s 
decision is typically mandated by Chevron v. NRDC,259 in 
Bluewater, the EPA was still required to take a “hard look”260 at 
the environmental consequences of the Category 3 regulations.  
In cases involving review of agency decisions, appellate courts 
are typically very deferential towards the actions of agencies if 
  
 254 Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 411-12. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id.  But see Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The 
overriding goal of [Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA] is air quality and the other listed 
considerations, while significant, are subordinate to that goal.”).   
 257 Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 413. 
 258 Id.  Bluewater addressed this argument in its brief by arguing that the 
EPA is misconstruing its mandate, which is actually to “set standards for emissions 
from new nonroad engines ‘which in the Administrator’s judgment cause, or contribute 
to, [ozone] pollution.”  Brief of Petitioner at 22, Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 
404 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120) (citing 42 U.S.C. §7547(a)(3)).  South Coast Air 
Quality Management District submitted a separate brief noting that the argument that 
there would be no loss in emission reductions was contradicted by the agency’s own 
calculations showing that Category 3 emissions were expected to rise between 2000 
and 2030.  Brief for South Coast Air Quality Management District as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 
03-1120). 
 259 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  See notes 246-50 supra and accompanying 
text, discussing the Chevron two-step analysis.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000). 
 260 See note 16, supra. 
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the issue requires technical expertise.261  But, since the court’s 
role is to ensure that the agency is publicly accountable,262 the 
public will suffer263 if, as here, the court merely gives deference 
to an agency action that fails to push technology to reduce 
emissions to the lowest level achievable.264  While it is clear 
that courts must not substitute their own judgments for those 
of the agency, a “court must make a careful and searching 
inquiry into the facts.”265  If the court determines that there is 
an air of bias in the agency’s decision, less deference may be 
appropriate even though the agency is a source of expertise on 
the matter.266  In situations where bias exists, the court must 
apply substantial evidence review, which requires the court to 
examine policy considerations, as well as factual evidence.267  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has even endorsed a careful 
review of the record in cases where closer scrutiny will prevent 
judicial review from being “meaningless.”268  Therefore, 
agencies should substantiate their decisions with factual 
evidence and sound policy decisions to ensure proper judicial 
review, as well as to inspire public confidence.269   
Closer scrutiny may also be justified in CAA cases since 
Congress is wary of the EPA’s actions with regard to 
implementing the Act.270  Specifically, Congress has taken a 
  
 261 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976).  See also Baltimore Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When examining 
this kind of scientific determination . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its most 
deferential.”). 
 262 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
 263 Angus MacBeth, et al., Cartoon Science:  The Struggle Between Politics and 
Science at the Environmental Protection Agency, 6 NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 5, 24-25 (May 2002). 
 264 See Part II.E.2, supra (discussing technology-forcing regulations and the 
EPA’s admission that technology is capable of further emissions reductions below the 
standards set by the final Category 3 emissions rule). 
 265 Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 649 (E.D. La. 2002). 
 266 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining 
that if the EPA applies a model rigidly, then the court will be forced to use a more 
searching inquiry). 
 267 Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 268 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). 
 269 Am. Fed’n of Labor, 617 F.2d at 651-52.  See also United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the court’s task is 
ensure public accountability “by requiring the agency to identify relevant factual 
evidence, to explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state 
candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for rejecting 
significant contrary evidence and argument”). 
 270 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 8. 
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critical look at the EPA’s failure to clean up the ambient air,271 
declaring that “the EPA needs to change its current structure 
to allow science to play a more significant role in decisions.”272  
As a result, both the House and the Senate have proposed 
legislation to create a Deputy Administrator for Science and 
Technology to oversee EPA decisions.273  This Deputy 
Administrator would be entrusted with the duty of ensuring 
that the EPA is using appropriate and relevant research to 
support its rulemaking.274  Furthermore, the Senate noted that 
in order to remove political bias from decision making within 
the EPA, the Assistant Administrator for Research and 
Development, who occupies the highest science job in the 
agency, should be appointed to a term of six rather than four 
years.275  By politically insulating the EPA’s highest ranking 
science position, the Senate hopes that the agency will focus 
more on science and will be able to achieve continuity across 
administrations.276 
Even the EPA has noted that over the last decade, 
concerns have been growing about its ability to assess risks to 
human health and the ecosystems.277  Confidence in the 
agency’s expertise is lagging for two primary reasons:  research 
and development only comprise about seven percent of the 
agency’s total budget,278 and policymakers are typically 
attorneys lacking formal scientific training.279 
  
 271 Id. 
 272 S. REP. NO. 108-2233, at S3184 (2004). 
 273 H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004).  See also 
MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 28-29. 
 274 H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004).  See also 
MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 28-29. 
 275 S. REP. NO. 108-2233, at S3184 (2004). 
 276 Id. 
 277 MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 16. 
 278 Id. at 6. 
 279 Id. at 5.  Even when the EPA is aware of environmental risks, the agency 
can be placed under pressure from the Executive Branch to refrain from taking action 
to enforce existing regulations.  Welch, supra note 4.  Former EPA Administrator 
Christie Todd Whitman wrote to Vice President Dick Cheney in 2001 expressing 
concern about the EPA’s lack of action to force power companies to upgrade their 
emissions controls.  Id.  Whitman warned Cheney, “We will pay a terrible political 
price if we undercut or walk away from enforcement cases.  It will be hard [for the 
EPA] to refute the charge that we are deciding not to enforce the Clean Air Act.”  Id.  
Later, Whitman remarked that “improv[ing] the role of science in decision-making” 
was one of the agency’s top priorities.  Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, 
“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal To Enhance Judicial Review Of Agency Science By 
Incorporating Daubert Principles Into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
7, 9 (2003), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/ 
lcp66dAutumn2003p7.htm. 
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Due to the lack of resources and technology within the 
EPA, as well as Congressional concerns of political bias, the 
Bluewater court should have been less deferential to the EPA 
with regard to Category 3 emissions -- a situation that also 
involves international ramifications280 and interpretation of 
Congressional intent.281  Here, the Bluewater court had a duty 
to use less deference in its review of the evidence, regardless of 
the EPA’s supposed expertise, due to the indications of bias on 
the record.282  For example, while the EPA claims that the 
MARPOL Annex VI provisions are sufficient domestic 
standards, the United States has been actively pushing the 
IMO for stricter international NOx regulations for several 
years.283  Moreover, the EPA has directly acknowledged that 
technological advancements are capable of further reducing 
emissions.284  In fact, the EPA notes that much of the same 
technology that will be used to control Category 3 marine 
emissions is similar to the technology that is used to control 
emissions from highway diesel engines.285  If the EPA has 
imposed steep reductions in emissions from land-based engines 
that use the same technology,286 it is unclear why the EPA 
would treat marine emissions regulations differently.  
Furthermore, the EPA was originally considering 
implementing emissions controls on all vessels in U.S. waters, 
including foreign-flagged vessels, and explicitly setting Tier 2 
NOx reductions at thirty percent beyond the MARPOL Annex 
VI standards prior to discussions with the OMB.287  Given this 
background, it is hard to believe the agency’s explanation that 
it has chosen to mimic the MARPOL Annex VI standards for 
now, while planning to assess the capabilities of technology to 
  
 280 See Part III, supra. 
 281 See Part II.E.1, supra. 
 282 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (1994) (explaining that 
if the agency applies a model rigidly, then the court will be forced to use a more 
searching inquiry). 
 283 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,554 (“At the same time, the 
United States government supports a revision of the Annex VI standards for NOx 
emissions, taking into account the emission reduction potential of new control 
technologies.”).  See supra Part II.E.2. 
 284 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,555.  See supra Part II.E.2. 
 285 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,567. 
 286 E.g., the EPA set the fuel sulfur content standard for nonroad diesel 
engines in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries to match 
the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard.  69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52, at 
38,960.   
 287 LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58, 72. 
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meet lower emission standards in the future.288  By ignoring the 
bias on the record and merely pushing the EPA’s decision 
through under the loose arbitrary and capricious standard, the 
Bluewater court, rather than actual scientific experts, 
ultimately ended up deciding that the agency’s regulations 
were adequate.289 
The Bluewater court also failed to address whether the 
EPA considered the most relevant data when establishing its 
rulemaking.290  Since 1970, nonroad engine and vehicle NOx 
and SOx emissions have continued to climb.291  The picture 
becomes even more bleak when one considers that researchers 
determined in 2003 that Category 3 vessels might actually be 
responsible for producing more than twice as much NOx as 
previously calculated.292  However, the EPA based its proposal 
and new regulations upon NOx and PM data collected in 1996 
and then relied upon models to estimate the emissions for the 
years after 1996.293  In one of its rulemaking notices, the EPA 
claimed that by applying the Tier 2 standards to just U.S.-
flagged vessels, NOx emissions would be reduced by 
approximately eleven percent by 2030.294  Since the EPA 
utilized outmoded data as the baseline from which to formulate 
its decision, the actual improvements to the environment as a 
result of the new regulations could be less than the EPA 
determined.  If this new NOx data collected in 2003 was not 
utilized by the agency, the rulemaking may have been 
arbitrary and capricious for failure to use accurate scientific 
methods. 
Finally, the agency’s decision mandated less deference 
by the court because the regulation touched on an international 
issue.  Courts should extend less deference whenever a 
situation involves an ambiguous statute that may conflict with 
international law.295  The Supreme Court determined in 
  
 288 See 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9748. 
 289 See MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 25. 
 290 See generally Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404 (2004). 
 291 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT 
EMISSION TRENDS: 1900-1998 (Mar. 2000), Ch. 3:  National Emission Trends, 1900-
1998, at 3-7. 
 292 James J. Corbett, Updated Emissions From Ocean Shipping, 108 J. 
GEOPHYSICAL RES., No. D20, at 14, available at http://www.ocean.udel.edu/cms/ 
jcorbett/CorbettKoehlerJGR2003.pdf. 
 293 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 29-30. 
 294 Id. at 86. 
 295 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that “an act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”296  Therefore, it was 
inappropriate for the Bluewater court to apply deference to the 
EPA’s decision because Category 3 emissions regulation 
involves international vessels and will affect the U.S.’s 
obligation to uphold the spirit of the no more favorable 
treatment clause of the MARPOL Convention.297 
From a policy perspective, the Bluewater court should 
have been skeptical of the agency’s decision to automatically 
exempt 94 percent of the vessels entering U.S. ports298 from its 
pollution regulations.  As discussed supra, the EPA founded its 
interpretation of CAA upon improper definitions of the terms 
nonroad engine and nonroad vessel.299  Further, the EPA 
declared in its final rule that the U.S. lacked jurisdiction 
because these vessels are only temporarily within the 
country.300  However, these rationales directly conflict with 
legal precedent301 and the EPA’s own arguments in 2002 to the 
OMB regarding interpretation of the CAA and proper 
environmental policy.302  Hence, the Bluewater court should 
have considered the policy implications of allowing the EPA to 
create a loophole for foreign-flagged vessels, while regulating 
emissions from U.S.-flagged Category 3 vessels. 
C. The D.C. Circuit Places Burden on Bluewater 
Despite the numerous reasons for which the court 
should have been skeptical of at the agency’s decision, the 
Bluewater court still chose to be deferential to the EPA.303  In 
supporting its deference, the court declared that Bluewater 
needed to show that instituting the EPA’s regulations would 
cause a loss in emissions reductions.304  The court also assumed 
that regardless of whether the EPA instituted a blanket 
  
 296 Id.  See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (quoting 
Murray, 6 U.S. at 118). 
 297 See supra Part III.B. 
 298 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563. 
 299 See supra Part II.E.1. 
 300 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759. 
 301 See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text. 
 302 See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing the EPA’s original interpretation of the 
terms nonroad vehicle, nonroad engine, and import). 
 303 Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 410 (2004). 
 304 Id. at 413. 
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exemption to foreign-flagged vessels, these ships would comply 
with MARPOL Annex VI regulations while in U.S. ports.305  
Both of these assumptions were in error. 
The Bluewater court stated that deference to the 
agency’s decision was appropriate because Bluewater Network 
failed to show that by instituting the Category 3 regulations, 
there would be a loss in emissions reductions.306  Here, the 
court seems to say that by maintaining the status quo or 
making minor improvements to air quality, the EPA fulfilled 
the mandate of Section 213 of the CAA.307  However, by putting 
this burden on the petitioner to show that there will not be a 
reduction in emissions by instituting weak regulations, the 
court misinterpreted the purpose of Section 213.308  When 
Congress drafted this section of the CAA, the section was 
written to be technology-forcing.309  As discussed in Part II.F 
infra, technology-forcing regulations are intended to provide 
the greatest protection to the public health and welfare, while 
the costs of implementation are secondary.  Ironically, the D.C. 
Circuit itself stated in 2001 that “[t]he overriding goal of 
[Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA] is air quality and the other listed 
considerations, while significant, are subordinate to that 
goal.”310  Therefore, one must question how the Bluewater court 
can be satisfied that the agency has promulgated regulations 
that adequately protect the public health and welfare if the 
agency is not pressing for the development of new technology.  
As a result, the effects of these lax regulations will not be 
measurable within the next twenty to thirty years.311  In fact, it 
may take longer than twenty or thirty years before a positive 
impact on the environment is noticeable since the MARPOL 
Annex VI standards are not going to be adopted and applied to 
all vessels under the EPA’s new regulations.312  Here, the 
Bluewater court had a duty to question why the agency failed 
to institute regulations that would provide greater protection to 
  
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 See id. at 411. 
 308 Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (2001) (“CAA section 213 is a 
technology-forcing standard.”). 
 309 Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000). 
 310 Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 200. 
 311 Lickel, supra note 66, at 150. 
 312 Id. 
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the public health and welfare.313  Hence, the court should have 
interpreted Section 213 literally and should have mandated 
that the emissions regulations press for improved technology, 
as Congress intended,314 so that the improvements in air 
quality could be felt sooner.   
The Bluewater court also upheld the agency’s action 
based upon the assumption that regardless of the EPA’s 
foreign-flagged vessel exemption, foreign-flagged ships would 
still comply with the MARPOL Annex VI standards.315  
However, Annex VI leaves the issue of compliance to port 
states.316  Therefore, the compliance of foreign-flagged vessels 
with the international standards can only be verified through 
parameter checks, which in the United States are typically 
conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard.317  The EPA’s Category 3 
regulations do not order the Coast Guard to conduct parameter 
checks to ensure compliance with the international 
standards.318  If the Coast Guard is not going to conduct 
inspections or parameter checks upon foreign-flagged vessels, 
there is no reason to assume that all foreign-flagged vessels 
will automatically comply with the MARPOL Annex VI 
standards while in U.S. ports.319  Since the U.S. has yet to 
  
 313 Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651-52 (1979).  See also 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating 
that the court’s task is ensure public accountability “by requiring the agency to identify 
relevant factual evidence, to explain the logic and the policies underlying any 
legislative choice, to state candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present 
its reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argument”). 
 314 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 655 F.2d 318, 328 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974)); H.R. REP. 95-294, at 273 
(1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352. 
 315 Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 413 (2004). 
 316 MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 11. 
 317 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,552.  The U.S. Coast Guard has 
diverse responsibilities, including maritime security, mobility, and safety, national 
defense, and protection of natural resources.  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Publication 1, 
U.S. Coast Guard:  America’s Maritime Guardian, at 5 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html.  Within its responsibilities of 
protecting natural resources, the USCG protects marine habitats, marine mammals, 
and endangered marine species, as well as enforces laws regarding the discharge of oil 
and other hazardous substances into the nations waters.  Id. at 10.  Furthermore, the 
USCG inspects foreign vessels and is the first to respond to environmental disasters.  
Id. 
 318 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9. 
 319 Flag states are primarily responsible for implementing MARPOL Annex VI 
and issuing the requisite certificates.  PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 58.  However, the 
number of vessels operating under “flags of convenience” has rapidly been growing.  Id. 
at 12.  Because “flags of convenience” are obtained from countries that have no means 
to enforce international standards, id. at 10, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
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ratify this treaty,320 and there is no legislation in place to 
implement the Annex,321 the Bluewater court erred in stating 
that compliance with the Annex standards would be assured322 
because there simply will be no one enforcing the MARPOL 
Annex VI standards on foreign-flagged vessels.323 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the United States conducts more sea-trading 
than any other nation,324 the EPA caved under political 
pressure from the OMB325 to provide a foreign-flag exemption to 
Category 3 marine vessels in its emissions regulations.326  By 
failing to monitor emissions from foreign-flagged vessels, the 
United States continues its pattern of exhibiting “disregard for 
what is considered acceptable by the rest of the world,”327 while 
mocking the goals of the CAA.328  
  
sometimes Annex VI standards will not be complied with in U.S. ports without U.S. 
Coast Guard enforcement.  See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International 
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 263 (1992) (noting that even ratification by 
a country does not mean that the agreed upon standards are being observed or 
monitored). 
 320 International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Conventions 
by Country, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D12899/ 
status.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).  See also Intertanko, 2005 Federal and State 
Legislative & Regulatory Update, Oct. 4, 2005, available at http://www.intertanko.com/ 
pubupload/INTERTANKO.ppt (noting that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
met on September 25, 2005 to discuss the treaty). 
 321 See 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9757. 
 322 372 F.3d 404 at 412-13. 
 323 A representative with the US Coast Guard who is responsible for 
conveying such guidance to the field offices confirmed that “since the US has not yet 
ratified Annex VI, [the Coast Guard has taken the position that it] can’t enforce it.”  E-
mail from Wayne Lundy, US Coast Guard, to Sandra Snyder (Dec. 8, 2005, 8:47 am 
EST) (on file with author).  See also ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 587-600 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing that mechanisms 
must be in place to supervise application of standards and rules because merely 
creating the standard itself does not ensure that the problem will be resolved). 
 324 LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 202, at 63.   
 325 See Welch, supra note 4 (explaining that the EPA’s Category 3 emission 
policy abruptly changed after the agency met with the OMB).  The OMB and the EPA 
were both lobbied by shipping organizations to provide the foreign-flag exemption.  See, 
e.g., Press Release, International Council of Cruise Lines, Cruise Industry Counters 
Bluewater Network Petition; Notifies Congress, U.S. Federal Agencies (April 10, 2000) 
http://www.iccl.org/pressroom/press27.cfm; Letter from the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (July 16, 
2002),  http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/IntertankoSubmission.pdf. 
 326 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9746. 
 327 PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 127 (1999). 
 328 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2000) (declaring a purpose of the CAA to be “to protect 
and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health 
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”). 
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Regardless, the EPA might find itself subject to further 
litigation due to the insufficiencies of the Category 3 emissions 
standards since Bluewater Network cautioned the EPA that it 
might face another lawsuit if MARPOL Annex VI were ever 
ratified in the U.S.329  However, due to the amount of deference 
that courts typically give to expert agencies on technical 
matters, it is unlikely that further litigation will overturn the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision.330  Hence, if courts are unwilling to stop 
providing deference to EPA rulemaking despite evident 
political bias, it is essential for Congress to pass proposed 
legislation creating the position of Deputy Administrator for 
Science and Technology within the EPA and changing the 
duration of term of the Assistant Administrator for Research 
and Development, so that the agency is capable of focusing 
more on science and less on politics.331  If one of these steps is 
not taken, the Executive Branch will continue to have the 
power to make a mockery out of the CAA by requesting that 
the EPA does not take all the available actions to improve air 
quality. 
Sandra Y. Snyder† 
  
 329 RUSSELL LONG, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS, available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/marinevessel/pdfs/long.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2005). 
 330 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976).  See also Baltimore 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
 331 S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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